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Interrelationship Between State and 
Individual Criminal Responsibility in 
International Law 
 
January 5, 2018 
by Emirjon Kaçaj* 
Introduction 
This article analyzes the interrelationship between state and individual criminal responsibility in 
international law. It argues that while international courts and related instruments governing these 
two regimes of liability suggest a clear separation between state and individual criminal 
responsibility, in practice they are closely connected.[1] By analyzing international jurisprudence, 
this article argues that there is no “pure separation” between state and individual criminal 
responsibility and that prior determinations of the latter significantly impact the establishment of 
former.[2] This article argues that a dependence on individual criminal liability would jeopardize 
the eventual accountability of the state by “hiding” behind the responsibility of the individual. 
Background 
The International Military Tribunal (IMT) and of the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East (IMTFE) paved the way to the establishment of individual criminal responsibility in 
international law.[3] Individual criminal responsibility broadened with the establishment of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and of the International Criminal Court (ICC).[4]These bodies ensure 
that individuals could no longer “hide” behind “abstract entities”, i.e. states.[5] 
Inevitably, the affirmation of individual criminal liability raised questions with regard to its 
interaction with state responsibility, which is determined by the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ). Hence, what is still debatable in international law is the interrelationship between state and 
individual criminal responsibility and when the same criminal conduct gives rise to both regimes 
of liability.[6] Therefore, having in mind the significant development of individual criminal 
responsibility, its repercussions on state responsibility and how these two regimes of liability 
interact assume a particular importance. 
 
* Emirjon Kaçaj, from Albania, is an international consultant on international law, human rights and labor-migration. 
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Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, International Labour Organization, International 
Organization for Migration and the World Bank. He holds a Law Degree from the University of Milan in Italy and 
an LL.M. from the American University Washington College of Law. Emirjon has authored and co-authored several 
articles, studies and reports including on international human rights, labor, migration, trafficking in human beings 
and European legislation. He also carried out research on the right to vote from abroad, right to adequate housing, 
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Analysis 
International instruments suggest that state and individual criminal responsibility are separate 
regimes of liability. The Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility and the Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind imply this 
separation.[7] The International Law Commission acknowledged that the punishment of 
individuals who are organs of the state does not exhaust issues related to state 
responsibility.[8] Hence, state and individual criminal responsibility are considered separate 
regimes of responsibility in international criminal law giving rise to dual responsibility, i.e. state 
and individual liability.[9] 
The separation between state and individual criminal responsibility is also suggested by the fact 
that different enforcement mechanisms deal with these two regimes of liability, i.e. the ICTY for 
individual criminal responsibility and the ICJ for state responsibility.[10] However, it is argued 
that this does not imply that these two regimes are not connected.[11] For instance, in Tadić the 
ICTY determined that the Bosnian-Serb politician was individually responsible from crimes 
committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in doing so it also considered issues of state 
liability.[12] When the ICJ was called to rule on Serbia’s responsibility during the conflict in 
former Yugoslavia, it criticized the ICTY for making recourse to rules of state responsibility and 
it found that Serbia was not guilty of genocide in relation to the crimes committed in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.[13] 
In the 2015 Genocide case, while the ICJ found that Serbia was not guilty of genocide in relation 
to Croatia for crimes committed during the conflict in former Yugoslavia, it reaffirmed the 
separation between state and individual criminal responsibility.[14] In particular, the ICJ noted 
that states may be held responsible under the Genocide Convention even though no individual was 
convicted of the crime.[15] Hence, the ICJ supported a clear separation between state and 
individual criminal responsibility, underlining their different legal regimes and 
aims.[16] However, this separation is blurred given that the ICJ considered ICTY’s prior 
determinations as “significant factor” in assessing Serbia’s genocidal intent.[17]Hence, the ICJ 
considered as significant factor the fact that the ICTY never charged any individual on account of 
genocide against the Croat population.[18]The ICJ added that mens rea, (psychological element) 
required by the Genocide Convention, must be established in order to determine state 
responsibility.[19] Hence, the ICJ applied typical requirements of individual criminal 
responsibility, i.e. mens rea.[20] However, considering that states are abstract entities, ICJ’s 
recourse to prior determinations on individual criminal responsibility appears to have been 
inevitable.[21] 
Conclusion 
While in theory international instruments and jurisprudence suggest a strict separation between 
state and individual criminal responsibility, in practice, these liability regimes are 
interrelated.[22] Arguably, this interrelationship presents signs of dependence, considering that 
individual criminal responsibility has significant repercussions on the determination of state 
responsibility.[23] 
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While the establishment of individual criminal liability contributes to the enforcement of 
international law, attention should not be shifted away from state responsibility.[24] Courts should 
be cautious in giving weight to prior determinations of individual criminal responsibility.[25] This 




[1]See infra notes 7-9. 
[2]See infra note 21. 
[3]See Article 6 of the IMT Charter and Article 5 of the IMTFE Charter. See generally Ciara Damgaard, Individual 
Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes 98-105 (2008). See also Pemmaraju Sreenivasa 
Rao, International Crimes and State Responsibility, in International responsibility Today 63, 64 (Maurizio Ragazzi 
ed., 2005). 
[4]See Article 7 of the ICTY Statute and Article 6 of the ICTR Statute (providing individual criminal 
responsibility). See also ICC Statute: Article 25 (Individual criminal responsibility); Article 27 (Irrelevance of official 
capacity); Article 28 (Responsibility of commanders and other superiors) and Article 33 (Superior orders and 
prescription of law). 
[5]See Trial of Major War Criminals before the IMT, Nuremberg, (Nov. 1945 – Oct. 1946), at 223 (stating that: 
“Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, – and only by punishing individuals 
who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced”). See also Philippe Kirsch, President, 
International Criminal Court, Keynote Address at the Washington University Conference: Judgment at Nuremberg, at 
2 (Sept. 30, 2006) (arguing that the Nuremberg trials constituted a historic moment in the development of international 
law). See generally Ciara Damgaard, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes 86 (2008) 
(analyzing the evolution of individual criminal responsibility). 
[6]See Beatrice Bonafè, The Relationship between State and individual responsibility for international crimes 1 
(2009). 
[7]See Article 25(4) of the ICC Statute. See also Article 58 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts. See also Article 4 of the Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind. 
[8]See Article 4 of the Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind. See also Article 7 of the ILC 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. 
[9]See Beatrice Bonafè, The Relationship between State and individual responsibility for international crimes 43 
(2009). 
[10]Id.at 193. 
[11]Id. at 194. 
[12]See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 105, 171 (lnt’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
July 15, 1999). See also Antonio Cassese, The Nicaragua and Tadić Test Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on 
Genocide in Bosnia, 18 EJIL 655-56 (arguing that in order to determine the meaning of ‘belonging to a Party to the 
conflict’ pursuant to Article 4(A)(2) of the Third Geneva Convention, and to determine the degree of authority or 
control over those armed units in the meaning of the term ‘belonging’, it was necessary to make reference to principles 
of state responsibility that establish when individuals may be regarded as acting as de facto state officials, since 
international humanitarian law did not contain any criteria in this regard). 
[13] See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶ 319 and 403 (Feb. 26, 2007) [hereinafter 
2007 Genocide case]. 
[14] See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. 
Serbia), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J., ¶ 402-440 (Feb. 3, 2015), [hereinafter 2015 Genocide case]. 
[15]See 2015 Genocide case at ¶ 128. See also 2007 Genocide case at ¶ 182. 
[16]See 2015 Genocide case at ¶ 129. See also Andrea Bianchi, State Responsibility and Criminal Liability of 
Individuals, in The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice 16, 19 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2009) (arguing 
that the purpose of these two regimes of liability is different because while individual criminal responsibility has a 
punitive character for particular atrocious crimes, the primary purpose of state responsibility is to provide reparations 
for a wrongful act). See also Beatrice Bonafè, Reassessing Dual Responsibility for International Crimes, 73 Sequência 
(Florianópolis) 20 (2016). 
[17]See 2015 Genocide case at ¶¶ 187 and 440. See also 2007 Genocide case at ¶ 217. 
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[18]See 2015 Genocide case at ¶ 440 (The Court also noted that Milošević’s indictment included charges of genocide 
in relation to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina but no such charges were brought in the part of the indictment 
concerned with the hostilities in Croatia. Id. at 187). See also 2007 Genocide case at ¶ 374. But see 2007 Genocide 
case, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh at ¶ 42 (criticizing the Court for relying on the 
prosecutorial decisions of the ICTY in order to determine the responsibility of the state). 
[19]See also 2015 Genocide case at ¶ 145. See also 2007 Genocide case at ¶ 187 
[20]See also Beatrice Bonafè, Reassessing Dual Responsibility for International Crimes, 73 Sequência (Florianópolis) 
25 (2016) (arguing that the ICJ applied the mens rea requirement, which is a typical requirement of the regime of 
individual criminal responsibility). 
[21]See 2015 Genocide case at ¶ 145 (where the Court noted that in absence of a State plan expressing the intent to 
commit genocide, it is necessary to analyze individual conduct of perpetrators). But see 2015 Genocide case, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Sebutinde at ¶ 17-20 (criticizing the Court for taking into account the prosecutorial decisions of the 
ICTY which are of discretionary nature). 
[22]See Beatrice Bonafè, The Relationship between State and individual responsibility for international crimes 200 
(2009) (confirming the existence of points of contact between state and individual criminal responsibility in 
the Tadić case). See also 2015 Genocide case at ¶ 187 (where the ICJ confirmed that significance will be given to 
prior determinations of the ICTY). 
[23]See Kimberley N. Trapp, State Responsibility for International terrorism 232 (2011) (arguing that determinations 
of individual criminal responsibility can play a decisive role in judicial determinations of state responsibility). See 
also André Nollkaemper, Concurrence between Individual Responsibility and State Responsibility in International 
Law, 52 ICLQ, 615 (2003) (arguing that prior findings related to individual criminal responsibility could influence 
future determinations on state responsibility). See also Beatrice Bonafè, Reassessing Dual Responsibility for 
International Crimes, 73 Sequência (Florianópolis) 35 (2016) (arguing that state responsibility appears dependent on 
the establishment of individual responsibility). But see Paola Gaeta, On What Conditions Can a State Be Held 
Responsible for Genocide?, 18 EJIL 641(2007) (arguing that state and individual criminal liability are fully 
independent of each other). 
[24]See Trial of Major War Criminals before the IMT, Nuremberg, (Nov. 1945 – Oct. 1946), at 223 (affirming that 
international law will be enforced by punishing the individual). See also Beatrice Bonafè, Reassessing Dual 
Responsibility for International Crimes, 73 Sequência (Florianópolis) 36 (2016) (arguing that state responsibility 
should not be confined to the safe area where individual responsibility has already been established). 
[25]See 2015 Genocide Case, Separate Opinion of Judge Sebutinde at ¶ 17-21 (criticizing the Court for taking into 
account prosecutorial decisions of the ICTY and for not having a global view of the evidence). See also 2007 Genocide 
case, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh at ¶ 35 (arguing that the Court failed to take into 
consideration additional evidence). See also Susana SáCouto, Reflections on the Judgment of the International Court 
of Justice in Bosnia’s Genocide Case against Serbia and Montenegro, 15 Hum. Rts. Brief 3 (2007) (arguing that the 
Court failed to explain why it chose not to pursue additional evidence apart from the ICTY records). 
[26]See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 123 (lnt’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 
15, 1999). See also Beatrice Bonafè, Reassessing Dual Responsibility for International Crimes, 73 Sequência 
(Florianópolis) 36 (2016) (flagging that states might evade responsibility if the determination of their liability is 
confined to the area of individual criminal responsibility). 
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Protecting Environmental Defenders 
February 27, 2018 
by Page Monji 
One of the first murders of an defender of environmental rights in 2017 was Isidro Balenegro 
Lopez, a subsistence famer, activist, and leader among the Tarahumara people.  He was a Goldman 
Environmental Prize winner in 2005 for his peaceful action against deforestation from illegal 
logging in the northern Mexican state of Chihuahua. Amidst threats against his and his family’s 
lives, Balenegro left the community, but was murdered upon returning to visit a family member in 
Coloradas e la Virgen. Balenegro’s story is one of many cases of deaths and increased risk of harm 
to land and environmental activists in 2017. 
With the UN’s release of the Sustainable Development Goals, the alarming lesson in these 
casualties and escalating violence is whether our global priorities also protect the defenders of 
those initiatives. The Sustainable Development Goals list among its environmental priorities 
climate action (including initiatives combatting climate change and the impacts of emissions), life 
below water (including the conservation and sustainable use of water resources and marine life) 
and life on land (including sustainable use of land resources). 
According to a report released by Global Witness, 197 land and environmental defenders were 
murdered globally in 2017. The report defines defenders as “people who take peaceful action to 
protect land or environment rights, whether in their own personal capacity or professionally.” This 
includes family members, friends, and colleagues of the defender who may have been murdered 
in retaliation of the defender’s efforts or in the same attack as that which resulted in the defender’s 
death. While the Global Witness’s coverage is limited, the underreporting of verified cases 
highlights the challenges in validating violence globally. Tension between government, 
companies, and local communities predominantly were driven by mining and oil, logging, 
agribusiness, poaching, water and dams. 
While Global Witness largely tracks verified murders, the Environmental Justice (EJ) Atlas tracks 
claims and testimonies of communities engaged in ecological conflict. So far, the EJ Atlas 
recorded 2,344 current claims of tension globally across 10 categories: Nuclear, Mineral Ores and 
Building Extractions, Waste Management, Biomass and Land Conflicts, Fossil Fuels and Climate 
Justice/Energy, Water Management, Infrastructure and Built Environment, Tourism Recreation, 
Biodiversity Conservation Conflicts, Industrial and Utilities Conflicts. The data illustrates the 
magnitude of global tension surrounding environmental causes and the onus upon governments 
and organizations to protect the activists who are at the front lines of environmental causes. 
Large scale ecological social tension often results in the murder, criminalization, 
and disappearances of human rights defenders. The cases presented by Global Witness and 
Environmental Justice highlight infringements of international law prohibiting violence against 
human rights defenders.  For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’s protections 
include the right to life, liberty, security, freedom of expression, prohibition on torture, peaceful 
assembly and association. Additionally, the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders contains 
protections accorded to human rights defenders, which include the right to peacefully assemble, to 
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form non-governmental organizations, to freedom of expression regarding human rights 
complaints, and to protection under domestic law. 
The magnitude of escalating violence and casualties highlight the increased risk for environmental 
defenders.  Furthermore, the heightened vulnerability poses critical questions of whether our 
global initiatives sufficiently protect the defenders of those efforts and who is best responsible to 
protect these advocates. 
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International Human Rights Through the 
Eyes of TWAIL 
March 23, 2018 
by Achalie Kumarage* 
Over a period of years, a discourse has been developing questioning the potential of the 
international human rights framework. International Human Rights Law (IHRL) is accused 
of failing to attain its aspirations and to be inclusive of diverse human experiences. Its enforcement 
towards different states has been a subject of controversy. The critique of IHRL has intensified 
with the recent trend of Western liberal democracies turning inward. The debt crises in 
Europe, poverty, racism, xenophobia, immigration, and alarming concerns of national security 
today all pose compelling questions for IHRL. The critique by Third World Approaches to 
International Law (TWAIL) of IHRL is increasingly relevant against this backdrop. Through the 
lens of TWAIL, this Article deconstructs the foundations of IHRL to ascertain its limitations in 
responding to these existing challenges. 
What is TWAIL? 
Originally aimed at critically examining the foundations of international law, TWAIL progressed 
as an adventure and an experiment. Emerging formally in the 1990s, TWAIL 
is distinguishable from a mere method of analysis. Professor Antony Anghie, a prominent scholar 
in the area, describes TWAIL as a particular set of concerns that a number of scholars from various 
locations with different perspectives and interests utilize. TWAIL as of now is in its second 
development epoch. 
TWAIL primarily aims to understand how international law affects people in the ‘third world.’ 
‘Third world’ no longer is constrained to a geographical rubric or as a label for under developed 
and developing countries. Instead, it is conceptualized as a social movement geared at furthering 
the interests of oppressed or marginalized people. These groups could mean under developed 
countries of the Global South or could even be marginalized populations in the developed Western 
liberal democracies, such as aborigines or natives, people of color, women, and poverty ridden 
cohorts in the community. 
TWAIL scholarship unravels how dynamics of international politics and transnational interaction 
have profoundly impacted and redefined IHRL. Although TWAIL’s critique of IHRL takes many 
forms, its core criticisms could be divided into three substantive layers, for the purpose of this 
Article: Eurocentrism, top-down approach, and non-inclusivity of all diverse human experiences. 
 
 
* Achalie Kumarage wishes to thank Professor Macarena Saez, Faculty Director of the Center for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law at the American University Washington College of Law, for her valuable comments on this 
article. 
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TWAIL’s Critique of IHRL 
TWAIL’s approach to IHRL is divided. On the one hand IHRL is seen as a mechanism through 
which people of the third world seek protection from depredations of state power, while on the 
other it is seen as everyday imperialism. The latter refers to the imposition of Western liberal 
morals upon relatively less powerful countries. It can be illustrated by an analogy of colonialization 
where Western European values were imposed on colonies, in the guise of ‘civilization,’ without 
any regard to the domestic systems of law and governance and the local cultures.  The monolithic 
mindset that was present in the inception of IHRL could be failing to grapple with the current 
issues of addressing poverty, social integration of diversity, and evaluating cultures. As TWAIL 
scholar and feminist Ratna Kapur asserts, the human rights promise of progress, emancipation, 
and universalism is thus exposed as a myopic project in light of the panic over national security, 
sexual morality, and cultural survival. 
Eurocentrism 
The Western European origin of the international legal framework is a fact. Legal historians such 
as J.H.W. Verzijl claim international law to be an exclusive product of the European mind. 
The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law states that the development of 
international law, would “generally ignore the violence, ruthlessness, and arrogance which 
accompanied the dissemination of Western rules, and the destruction of other legal cultures in 
which that dissemination resulted.” Further, it “even discards such extra-European experiences 
and forms which were discontinued as a result of domination and colonization by European 
powers” and deems it “irrelevant to a (continuing) history of international law.” It continues to be 
Western, not merely because of its origin, but also owing to the absence of any substantive non-
Western contribution to its development. Though there have been cohesive contributions by 
scholars from the third world, their viewpoints have been diluted in Western thinking and 
education and the forceful counter challenges waged by first world actors. 
Although birthed from the ashes of the atrocities committed during World War II, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the nine core international human rights treaties are 
founded upon the predominant contribution by the First World and Western European states. 
Therefore, the basic framework of IHRL is reliant on an illusion of symmetry and equal status to 
all countries rooted in sovereignty. Some scholars now contend that it is the untiring efforts of 
the Global South that sustained IHRL subsequent to the 1960s. Among the TWAIL proponents, 
Latin American scholars seem to come out stronger in the International Human Rights fora. 
However, their role is more profound in developing an exemplary regional approach to human 
rights thorough the Inter-American system. 
Complexities have arisen through the change of power dynamics in the world. As new democracies 
such as India, Brazil, and the Republic of China are emerging powerfully on the global stage, 
Eurocentrism that made domination possible in the colonial era is no longer a fact. Elsewhere in 
the world, the political dynamics are becoming even more complex with Arabic 
countries opposing Western secularization. In view of these changes, a revision of IHRL in a more 
inclusive and wider perspective is necessary. 
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Top-Down Approach 
The top-down approach of IHRL has been the subject of criticism of many scholars. The approach 
illustrates the emanation of IHRL from global elite actors, including international organizations 
such as the United Nations, perpetuating dominance as well as tools for domination. The top-down 
approach to IHRL can be criticized on two key points. Firstly, as an inevitable consequence of 
Eurocentrism. Secondly, as a product of a collective state-level effort which doesn’t adequately 
represent the ethos and aspirations of the common people. 
The first has its roots in the era of colonialism and imperialism where the Western liberal 
democracies, in particular Western Europe, dominated international legislating. However, one 
could argue that the IHRL framework was set in motion following World War II, which was a 
more diverse stage led by the United States. Nevertheless, the final traces of colonialism were 
present as late as the 1970’s in states such as Taiwan. In fact, it is claimed that some regions such 
as Africa and even the Middle East are victims of neo-colonialism, for which IHRL is manipulated 
to penalize the states and its people rather than as a tool for their “salvation.” 
The second criticism is closely connected and is likely giving rise to the existing IHRL violations. 
The states were exclusively involved in founding IHRL (as opposed to developing it later on). 
The charter based system’s initial stages did not involve independent experts or civil society. 
Implementation of this legal framework exemplifies a top-down approach. This is particularly 
important in using IHRL as a counter-majoritarian instrument against state power. Moreover, the 
political power dynamics affect enforcement of IHRL. The United States, a founding contributor 
of IHRL, has been criticized by many TWAIL scholars on its’ compliance with the framework, 
especially when it comes to issues such as torture. 
Non-Inclusivity of Diverse Human Experience 
The cumulative result of the above two realities has been the non-inclusivity of diverse human 
experiences in IHRL. Being inclusive of diverse human experience, a seemingly impossible 
taskattainable as IHRL is stipulated in normative and broad principles rather than ‘laws’ in a 
narrower and more domestic sense. An illustration of this is the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), which is not a treaty in the strictest sense but has become binding in customary 
international law. 
Outside evaluation of cultural diversity and non-inclusivity is a continuing problem in IHRL. This 
is evident in the neo liberal economic agenda of the international superpowers. The major 
compelling question TWAIL raises is: Can Western liberal democracies impose the blueprint for 
political and economic development for the advancement of other countries in the world? 
TWAIL further unravels that some of the new human rights challenges before Western liberal 
democracies have been crippling the third world for many years such as war, terrorism, and 
poverty. TWAIL scholars express displeasure in the double standards of the international 
community in implementing IHRL. The discourse has been built around dealing with cases such 
as terror and torture in Afghanistan as opposed to Guantanamo Bay, and proposals for pre-emptive 
self-defense by first world countries such as the United States, Europe, and Russia. 
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Conclusion 
In light of the above analysis one could naturally demand an alternative discourse. Scholars such 
as Kapur, in fact, enquire if the human rights project that “held out the promise of a grand spicy 
fete mutated into an insipid appetizer.” However, TWAIL scholars such as Anghie are of the 
opinion that there is no equally profound alternate discourse to entirely replace IHRL. Others are 
more hopeful and are exploring additional non-liberal emancipatory possibilities. 
As the Oxford handbook states, although we may not be able to learn from the mistakes of the 
past, TWAIL promises a better understanding of the character of a particular legal order, its 
promise, and its limits. IHRL therefore should welcome TWAIL as a reconstructive project, which 
potentially credits the aspirations it desires to achieve. 
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Assisted Reproductive Technology, 
Parenthood, and Rights Implications 
May 28, 2018 
by Achalie Kumarage 
With the increasingly pervasive role played by technology in assisting reproduction, 
imperative questions are raised in terms of right to life, parenthood, and family. Highly contested 
cases have been fought before national and international courts over the past twenty years. The 
root cause of all such cases is the fact that human life is no longer only created by conventional, 
natural means. With assisted reproductive technology (ART), what once were questions of fate 
have turned into matters of choice intertwined with rights. 
Evincing the complexity of this phenomenon, the latest data suggests that there are more than 
620,000 cryo-preserved embryos in the United States alone. The vast majority of these cryo-
preserved embryos are still being considered for use in the family-building efforts of the couples 
who created them. Questions related to the use of these embryos particularly arise following 
decisions by genetic parents to separate as a couple, divorce, or upon deciding the number of 
children. 
Focusing on In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), this Article explores the complicated rights of parenthood 
and family life in IVF, and analyzes the varying approaches developed by national and 
international courts in addressing difficult rights-related questions. 
Assisted Reproductive Technology: Definitions and the Legal Framework 
ART has grown in both means and effectiveness over the years. The reproductive process can now 
be severed, allowing interventions or substitutions at different stages of the reproductive process. 
The key ART for this analysis, IVF, is the process of fertilization by extracting eggs and sperm, 
and manually combining them in a laboratory dish. The embryo(s) is then either transferred to the 
uterus or preserved. Cryo-preservation aids the embryo to survive for years. The possible number 
of years for preservation is generally stipulated by the law. The success rate of IVF, though it 
varies from case to case, is said to be between twenty to fifty percent, and there is no 
significant difference in success rates between fresh and frozen embryos. Often the process is 
carried out by parties subject to a contractual agreement, which governs the process and its results. 
All key international and regional human rights instruments enshrine a right to privacy, family life, 
and the non-interference of the state to decisions made within the private sphere. At the same time, 
they uphold a right to life. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948) in Articles 
12 and 16 upholds the same, while the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) expresses similar rights in Article 17. Regional human rights bodies such as the Inter-
American system and the European system are more promising and strongly advocate for these 
rights. For instance, the American Convention of Human Rights (1969) upholds a guarantee of 
non-suspension of the right to family life (Article 17) by the State. The instruments further grant 
equal rights to men and women to make decisions pertaining to family life. 
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International law, however, allows leeway for national laws governing these rights. There is 
minimum guidance set by international law in resolving issues involving embryo preservation. In 
the United States, there are no federal regulations governing the disposition of frozen embryos 
created through assistive technology. However, some countries, such as the United Kingdom, 
have domestic statutes. Generally, though the IVF process is carried out subject to a contractual 
agreement, this is not always upheld by the courts in resolving disputes and may not necessarily 
address particular future issues that can arise. 
Compelling Questions Raised by the Discourse Surrounding Rights 
As described above, the ART process adds multiple new dynamics to the natural reproductive 
process. In light of this fact, there are two key substantive rights-related challenges that IVF poses 
for national and international courts: (1) balancing the competing constitutional rights to procreate 
and not procreate, and (2) tracing the place of the embryo in the debate of personhood. As the 
analysis of IVF develops, it is hard to overlook its stark resemblance to the abortion debate and 
the views expressed pertaining to the issues of rights and life. 
• Balancing Competing Rights 
Harvard law professor and renowned academic in the area Glenn Cohen raises the difficulty of 
balancing one person’s constitutional right to procreate with another’s countervailing 
constitutional right not to procreate. Designating his point in the equation between the genetic 
parent and the gestational parent, he opines that the rights of both parties are equally strong in the 
debate. Drawing an analogy between this issue and the abortion debate, specifically Roe v. Wade, 
he questions “if women have the right to not be forced to be a gestational parent, do men – or 
women – have the right not to be forced to be a genetic parent?” 
United States courts have addressed these matters through three approaches: the balancing 
interests approach, the contractual approach, and the contemporaneous mutual consent approach. 
The balancing interests approach resolves disputes by “considering the position of parties, 
significance of their interests and the relative burden imposed by differing resolutions.” In 
Colorado in the case of In re the Marriage of Drake F. Rooks and Mandy Rook, the Academy of 
Adoption and Assisted Reproductive Attorneys said that courts must take a “balancing of 
interests” approach in such disputes, but should “give special weight to the partner who does not 
want to have genetic offspring.” On the other hand, the contractual approach resorts to giving 
effect to the agreement devised by the parties at the point of pursing IVF, given that the contract 
stands valid and enforceable. Finally, the mutual consent approach resonates with the second 
approach, favoring the consent expressed in a valid contract and any modifications carried out with 
contemporaneous mutual consent of the other party. 
Lisa Ikemoto, a bioethics professor at the University of California, has said that one party’s right 
not to procreate has usually been considered to trump the other’s right to procreate. Aptly 
summarizing the debate, Professor Cohen highlights that although the first child born from a cryo-
preserved embryo was in 1984, United States courts “have not been addressing this issue head-
on.” 
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Similarly, other countries are also grappling with various legal issues arising as a result of 
burgeoning IVF practices. In China, parents of a deceased couple were recently granted the right 
over fertilized eggs of the couple. Having gone through a “legal minefield” until their grandchild 
was born through a surrogate mother, the four grandparents are now preparing to legally establish 
their relations to the child through DNA testing. 
International courts adjudicate similar cases with a relatively loose approach. This is due to the 
tedious exercise of having to balance competing rights enshrined in international conventions with 
applicable national law. The European Court of Human Rights often predicates on the parties’ 
consent, while giving substantial weight to the “margin of appreciation” to give effect to relevant 
domestic legislative provisions. This is evident in judgments such as Evans v. United 
Kingdom (2005) where the court rejected the claim of violation of the right to privacy and family 
life based on withdrawal of consent by one party. Withdrawal of consent was the cause for 
termination agreed to by the parties at the time of making the contract, and national laws reflected 
respecting the decision of the parties. On the other hand, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights in Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica depicts an instance where the right to family life 
(Article 17) and the right to privacy (Article 11) superseded concerns of the right to life. The 
court upheld that the non-availability of IVF itself could amount to a violation of the right to family 
life and privacy, after Costa Rica had banned IVF on the basis that it violated the right to life. 
On a different note, some scholars opine that more than two parties can be involved in these 
disputes and that personal intention is a more significant element. Since the IVF process can be 
severed it becomes depersonalized and multiple persons may be involved in one or a few stages of 
the reproductive process and then later withdraw from it after their role is fulfilled. 
• Embryos & Personhood 
Is the human embryo a person? The answer to this question has significant implications for human 
rights. Answers to this question could either lift or strengthen the guarantee of non-interference by 
the state to a person’s privacy and family life, depending on the state’s interest in protecting life. 
Fertilization is a process, therefore, personhood does not attach the moment an embryo starts to 
develop. The scientific view is that the embryo is not a person during its ‘pre-embryo’ stage of 
fourteen days. In In re the Marriage of Drake F. Rooks and Mandy Rooks, the counsel for Drake 
Rooks asserted that the constitutional right to be a parent may not have any bearing upon matters 
passing the point of conception. Arguing that the case is no longer about separate human cells but 
a formed fetus, the counsel stated that the cases of frozen embryos are an “unknown territory.” 
This sentiment reflects strong parallels to the abortion debate which ultimately boils down to a 
matter of individual choice versus a matter of life, as decided in Roe v. Wade and more recently 
in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt (2016). 
The distinction between embryos and personhood is unsettled at a global level, and international 
courts prefer to give effect to the laws of the jurisdiction from which a case is 
emanating. Rulings of the European Court of Human Rights best exemplify this position. 
Conclusion 
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In resolving disputes in the area, different approaches are suggested by scholars. Some propose 
proceeding with the contractual approach while others propose a property approach as an 
alternative. In the case of Mimi Lee and James Cohen, from California, it was expressed that “the 
policy best suited to ensuring that these disputes are resolved in a cleareyed manner — unswayed 
by the turmoil, emotion and accusations that attend to contested proceedings in family court — is 
to give effect to the intentions of the parties at the time of the decision at issue.” Courts in the 
United States and internationally have frequently precipitated on this contractual approach. 
Many of the questions brought in the ART and procreation debate resonate with concerns and 
questions that were raised during the abortion debate. Such similarities create the possibility of 
further pushing the issue into a grey area in which law and policy makers hesitate to tread. The 
dynamics of this matter are so increasingly complex that leaving it unaddressed, or to be resolved 
only on a case by case basis, might lead to an exacerbated human rights battle in the near future. 
 
